Månad: november 2023

Only a couple weeks after the anniversary of the Nord Stream explosions another incident affecting critical undersea infrastructure in the Baltic Sea took place. In the early morning of October 8, a Finnish gas company, Gasgrid, reported a drop in pressure of the Balticconnector pipeline caused by a leak. In addition to the pipeline, which runs between Finland and Estonia, it was discovered that two undersea telecommunications cables nearby were also damaged, all around the same time. While we cannot talk about a deliberate attack by either a state or private actor yet, as the investigation is still ongoing, the lack of being able to establish attribution in cases of possible hybrid aggression unfortunately seems to be the norm rather than the exception.

Both undersea cables and pipelines generally fall under the definition of critical infrastructure as the services they provide are critical for telecommunication and energy transmission. Damage, both intentional and unintentional, to critical infrastructure could have massive implications on land-based systems. For instance, the island of Tonga was cut off from the internet for almost a week in January 2022 when its only communications cable was damaged in an earthquake. The undersea cables are also critical from a strategic point of view as they can transport sensitive or classified information. In case of damage, the equipment would have to be retrieved from the seafloor, potentially from great depths, to ensure the information doesn’t fall into the wrong hands. Targeting key pipelines in this sensitive energy market could have a significant impact on energy supply and prices.

After the Balticconnector incident NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg expressed NATO’s support for Finland and Estonia and said that NATO will mount a ”determined” response if a deliberate attack is proven. Following the incident NATO also announced that it has increased its presence in the area. On its own, increasing NATO presence in the area is unlikely to have enough of a deterrent effect to stop future attacks. It is impossible to physically monitor thousands of kilometers of pipelines and cables across multiple oceans, and malign actors know it. Therefore, in addition to increased manpower, it is crucial that more efforts are focused on developing technology for tracking vessels and for undersea surveillance equipment like autonomous sensors. 

In recent years Russian “ghost ships” have been suspected of mapping critical infrastructure sites in the Baltic Sea. ”Ghost ships” are vessels that have turned off their Automatic Identification System (AIS) signal which is typical for warships, other government vessels and civilian vessels that try to hide their movements. In order to be able to map out their navigation patterns, development of satellite imagery is vital. The Norwegian startup Vake is tracking ghost vessels that navigate with their AIS signal turned off. They have especially been following the movements of the Russian navy vessel Admiral Vladimirski, which according to reports has been sighted navigating above the Balticconnector pipeline earlier this year. It has also gotten attention on its previous trips when it has been navigating around both undersea infrastructure and offshore wind farms in the Baltic and North Sea. 

At this point of the investigation into the Balticconnector incident, a shipping vessel flying Hong Kong’s flag, called Newnew Polar Bear, is thought to have caused the incident by dragging its anchor over the cables and the pipeline. While it is doubtful that Chinese actors would have an incentive to attack critical infrastructure in the Gulf of Finland, experts are speculating about the possibility of the crew being bribed by Russian actors. Due to the presence of the Russian navy vessel Admiral Vladimirski earlier this year nearby and the knowledge of Russia’s vast capabilities of targeting infrastructure on the deep seabed it is not unfounded to suspect Russia’s possible involvement. 

During the year after the Nord Stream explosions the international community has taken steps to better protect critical infrastructure. NATO has announced a Critical Infrastructure Coordination Cell in January of 2023 which aims to “improve information sharing and exchange best practices between NATO Allies, partners, and the private sector”. At the Vilnius Summit 2023 leaders agreed to establish NATO’s Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure within NATO’s Maritime Command. Most recently, the Digital Ocean Vision initiative was formally endorsed by NATO’s defense ministers, along with the Swedish defense minister, on October 12 and will build on the previous efforts by enhancing maritime situational awareness through a range of assets like satellites and autonomous systems both under and above the surface.

Additionally we have seen EU-NATO collaboration through the establishment of the EU-NATO Task Force on Resilience of Critical Infrastructure which was launched in March 2023. The task force focuses on cooperation in four areas; energy, digital infrastructure, transport and space. Spatially it is not limited to the maritime domain but special focus is paid to this area post Nord Stream. This ”special focus” is likely to continue now as critical infrastructure is damaged again in the Baltic Sea. 

The task forces and coordination cells which have been set up are clearly proof that more attention is being paid to threats to critical undersea infrastructure. The Balticconnector incident has shown us that Finland and Estonia are resilient to damage caused to its infrastructure. The data traffic from the damaged cable was immediately rerouted to another cable. In order to compensate for the loss of energy imports from the Balticconnector pipeline, Finland operationalized an LNG terminal in the port of Inkoo, which was built last year with this specific type of threat in mind. Although the damage from the Balticconnector incident was minor due to the resilience of these two states, it is alarming that within a very short amount of time two major pipelines have been targets and attribution remains difficult.

With the current geopolitical tensions in the Baltic Sea, and the unlikeliness of Russia decreasing its activities in the area, it is crucial to stay vigilant and focus on how to be more proactive to defend critical infrastructure. Even though there are mechanisms in place to take over for the damaged infrastructure, if the incident proves to be a deliberate attack, it is an attack on state sovereignty. Therefore, it is critical to develop mechanisms to be able to establish attribution, which would allow for a clear response from affected countries.

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On June 20th, during the Ukraine Recovery Conference in London, the European Commission announced the Ukraine Facility, a €50 billion multiyear fund to help Ukraine “recover, reconstruct and modernize” from the devastation of Russia’s invasion. With new data from the Kiel Institute showing the EU overtaking the US on total aid commitments to Ukraine, the Ukraine Facility–the EU’s attempt to institutionalize support over the next years–will play a vital role for Ukraine’s economic recovery and its future in Europe. The EU therefore needs to make sure its implementation is effective and expeditious.

The Ukraine Facility is a four-year, €50 billion facility with “non-repayable support and loan support” to “cater for both short-term recovery needs and medium-term reconstruction and modernization of Ukraine”. The key part of this funding mechanism will be a recovery plan, drafted by Ukraine together with the EU. The recovery plan will outline necessary reforms on rule of law, public administration and anti-corruption Ukraine will have to implement to receive funding from the instrument. 

In this way, the Ukraine Facility greatly resembles the NextGenerationEU (NGEU)– the EU’s recent €800 billion recovery instrument with both grants and loans to kickstart the EU’s economy after COVID-19. The NGEU has faced a number of problems from lack of flexibility to burdensome bureaucracy; it offers useful lessons for how to implement the Ukraine Facility. Receiving most NGEU funding requires a member state to submit a national Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP); each plan has to be approved by the Council of the European Union. Although these are two inherently different recovery instruments brought about by very different sets of circumstances and with different end goals–their structure revolving around a national plan as well as their implementation–is set on similar guidelines by the European Commission. Therefore, the EU should take lessons from the NGEU implementation when designing the Ukraine Facility. 

”With new data from the Kiel Institute showing the EU overtaking the US on total aid commitments to Ukraine, the Ukraine Facility–the EU’s attempt to institutionalize support over the next years–will play a vital role for Ukraine’s economic recovery and its future in Europe.”

Rigid, Bureaucratic and Slow

There are three things the EU should take into account when designing the Ukraine Facility. The first is flexibility. The NGEU’s lack of flexibility was evident at the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when many in the EU advocated redirecting NGEU funding to detach the bloc from Russian energy. To achieve this goal, a new instrument, REPowerEU, had to be created. This took considerable time, as all member states needed to renegotiate their national RRP’s to get the funding. The ability to adapt to potential future challenges is therefore something the EU has to take into account with the Ukraine Facility to ensure the instrument’s maximum success. 

The second lesson is to design a simple recovery instrument. A major problem of the national RRP’s have been their bureaucratic complexity. In France, the President of the French Court of Auditors slammed the French RRP for “being over-complicated, difficult to monitor, and involving too many actors that are not immediately identifiable”. In Italy, many small municipalities have been unable to handle the large bureaucracy and complexity of the Italian RRP. By February 2023, Italy had only spent €25.7bn of the €66.9bn of its NGEU funding. As Italy only has until 2026 to spend all of its allocated funding for the envisaged reforms, these problems are holding back its economic recovery. It is therefore important to keep the Ukrainian plan simple to ensure the needed transparency–especially for funding allocated to regional and local governments. Simple plans will also enable Ukraine to fully utilize all available funding to ensure a timely recovery and reconstruction. 

The third lesson is to ensure a quick adoption of the Ukraine Facility; the EU should strive to launch the fund as planned by early 2024. One of the main criticisms of the NGEU was the slow adoption—due to infighting—of the instrument and the national RRP’s. The same should not happen with the Ukraine Facility, as the recovery and reconstruction needs in Ukraine are tremendous and urgent. 

A Crucial Moment for the EU

The proposed Ukraine Facility shows the EU recognizes the need for both speed and flexibility. However, even after European Commission President von der Leyen’s 2023 State of the European Union Address, there are still no further details. The Ukraine Facility presents a unique opportunity to move Ukraine economically closer to the bloc, a potential watershed moment on Ukraine’s path to EU membership. The proposed recovery instrument for Ukraine therefore needs to be flexible, bureaucratically straightforward and in place by the start of 2024. The successful implementation of the Ukraine Facility will ultimately show the world whether Brussels can take an effective leadership role in Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction.

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